In seventies Italy, Paolo Virno was part of the radical, autonomous left wing. Today he is a philosopher and teaches at the University of Cosenza. While Toni Negri and Michael Hardt apply the concept of the »multitude« very emphatically, Virno, in his book »Grammar of the Multitude,«1 significantly undertook to define this term more precisely.

[b]Klaus Ronneberger:[/b] Let’s first look back. If one follows the controversies about the significance of »immaterial labor« circulating today, one is somehow reminded of the debates of the sixties and seventies. While at that time the traditional left wing saw a potential for liberation in work, more militant currents, such as the Italian operaists, demanded a release from disciplined labor. This was coupled with the idea of »autonomy,« the vision of organizing the workers’ movement beyond capital, state and the conventional institutions. What do you, as a longstanding political activist and theorist, regard as the innovations of the (post)operaistic approach? Which continuities and breaks characterize this militant left-wing project?

[b]Paolo Virno:[/b] The operaistic tradition has been trying to come to terms with the crisis of industrial society ever since the eighties. The possibility of understanding wage labor as biographical episode and no longer as a lifelong existential necessity and source of a lasting identity: this was the great transformation in which we are both protagonists and witnesses. Direct exertion and hard work have become marginal production factors or, as Marx put it in the famous pages of his »Foundations«: a »miserable residue.« To use another expression of Marx’s, one could join him in asserting that »labor is now secondary to the production process, rather than being its main actor.« Science, information, general knowledge and social cooperation represent today »the great pillar supporting the production of wealth,« taking on the function formerly filled by working hours. Nevertheless, working time, or on the contrary, its »theft,« is still the parameter by which social development and the wealth of a society is gauged. The abandonment of industrial society as a process full of contradictions is leaving the stage open for the sharp antinomies of some disturbing paradoxes.
Working time is still the prevailing yardstick, but no longer the true one. In this sense one can claim without a shred of irony that industrial society has fallen prey to the very exigencies of a social systems based on wage labor. Unemployment is triggered by investments (and not by a lack thereof), flexibility becomes the despotic rule, the precariousness of employment emerges as the norm, people constantly traverse the border between work and non-work, archaisms of the disciplinary society come back into fashion as a way of controlling individuals who are no longer subject to the dictates of the factory regime: this is the way Postfordism has dealt with the crisis of industrial society. This kind of recidivism recalls what Marx wrote about public corporations: they defeat private ownership by exploiting the basis of private ownership. A real defeat occurs in our case as well (of wage labor), but the basis on which this is carried out is that very same wage labor (i.e. the rules and units of measure that are typical of wage labor). This is the level on which the old demand for a liberation from work has been represented in recent years.
Between past and present there is continuity, however. In the sixties and seventies, the workers’ movement fought to unhitch wage increases from productivity growth. People spoke of wages as an »independent variable.« This slogan met with boundless hatred on the part of the bourgeoisie and the reformists. And the hatred was well-founded. If wages are no longer tied to productivity, then every »theory of justice« is laid open to ridicule. It’s no longer a case of finding a »just« price for labor as a good: what is called into question (by subjecting the price to an inexorable process of inflation) is the very existence of such a good. Today, in the era of chronic precariousness, the slogan of »wages as independent variable« is gaining new currency. The new demand is called: »a base income for all.« The right to an income that is independent from the work performed is a way of taking the paradoxes of Postfordist capitalism to their logical conclusion.

[b]Ronneberger:[/b] The paradigm of »Postfordism« has dominated left-wing capitalist criticism for almost thirty years now. Why has no one been able to come up with a more precise term for this socialization model?

[b]Virno:[/b] All forms of »post-« are despicable creations, you’re right. They are usually a sign of intellectual laziness or the backwardness of the theoretical analysis. In this case, though, we are dealing with a real problem that at least partially justifies the use of so vague a term. It is in fact very difficult to define contemporary production on the basis of economic categories or a precise management model. The method of production is characterized instead more by the exploitation of linguistic/cultural, ethical and cognitive attitudes and assets, which have more to do with a way of life than with the execution of labor in the narrower sense. Fordism and Taylorism disposed with the figure of the specialized worker by introducing a new system of machines and management techniques. Postfordism is based primarily on the more general capabilities of Homo sapiens, on his being-in-the-world, his malleability and undifferentiated potential. A form of capitalism that exploits specific fundamental anthropological traits by uniting »base« with »superstructure,« technologies with moods, communicative with instrumental behavior, is destined to make do without its own name for a long time.

[b]Ronneberger:[/b] The subtitle of your new book, »Studies of Contemporary Forms of Living,«2 signalizes that you are not interested only in a philosophical analysis of terms, or one based on class theory, but instead in socio-anthropological issues as well. What prompted you to take this approach?

[b]Virno:[/b] As I already hinted in my answer to the last question, I am convinced that contemporary capitalism can only be adequately analyzed if one draws on a broad set of theoretical tools going beyond the limits of political economics. Since human language has become a raw material in the production process, it seems logical to (also) delve into texts by Wittgenstein or Chomsky in order to better understand how activities outside of work are structured. Viewed in more general terms, there seems to me to be a correspondence today between some of the fundamental characteristics of human nature, which are unchangeable, and certain key concepts of Postfordism. Take so-called »flexibility« for example: this represents nothing other than the historical societal (capitalist) translation of non-specialized instincts of the human animal. Or take the social commitment to »lifelong learning«: What is this if not the historical echo of the bio-anthropological concept of neoteny, the persistence in adults of certain juvenile qualities? We could go on in this vein ad infinitum. The use of anthropological, linguistic, psychological or philosophical categories is not a mere fashionable gesture, but rather a sheer necessity if one wishes to present a materialist analysis of the ways in which profit is created today.

[b]Ronneberger:[/b] After reading your book, one might have the impression that you argue the concept of the multitude less euphorically than Antonio Negri or Michel Hardt. You speak of »multiplicity« being deeply embedded in the »dialectic of fear and security.«3 The many people who make up the multitude are those who share the state of »not being at home.«4 This gives them something to set against their contingency and the unexpected, thus enabling them to protect themselves. At the same time, you warn of a »dangerous search for security,« which might take the form of racism or an »elbow mentality.« What significance can be ascribed in this connection to the phenomenon of »precariousness« (precarius [lat.]: uncertain, impermanent, at the mercy of circumstances), which in recent years has increasingly become an issue in social protest movements?

[b]Virno:[/b] Despised by Hobbes, who saw it as the virtual return to the natural state within civilized society, the multitude today constitutes the basic form of political existence. It is hence no longer an accidental episode, but instead a stable way of being. In an age in which the modern state as we know it is coming to an end and the »monopoly on political decision-making« once held by the state is breaking up, a plurality of individual subjects is emerging in every fold of the social organization, able to circumvent the cycles of democratic representation or sometimes even rob them of their power. The multitude is consequently ambivalent: sometimes aggressive, at other times marked by solidarity; it can tend equally toward intelligent cooperation or to gang warfare; it is both poison and antidote. I suggest viewing the multitude as a natural history category. It adapts itself to the historical situation, in which all the qualities of human nature, from the expression of biological drives to linguistic articulation, have taken on a direct political meaning. The »many« introduce into the political sphere the uncertainty and potential of an animal that doesn’t have its own restricted niche available to it in its environment and is therefore open to the whole world. This uncertainty and potential – this precariousness, if you will – can express itself in destructive forms, with a high proportion of aggressiveness. Carl Schmitt wrote that the radical critique of the state is based on the conviction that human nature is fundamentally gentle and good. Now it’s a matter of disproving this thesis. It’s about showing that the radical critique of the state and its »political decision-making monopoly« openly acknowledges the necessity of keeping »so-called evil,« in other words the aggressiveness of our own species, under control. The multitude opens up the possibility of an exodus, a chance to break out of the state model. In the course of this exodus, however, people will again and again be found to »grumble,« to get wrapped up in internal battles and the manifestation of (self-) destructive drives. A theory of the multitude must come to terms with this negativity if it is to be politically effective.

[b]Ronneberger:[/b] In the »Grammar of the Multitude« you compared the activities of Postfordist workers with those of artists: at the center of their practice is speech and action, which does not generate any direct material results, but that does require the presence of other people. At the same time, habitual mobility is demanded from those employed, the ability to continually adapt themselves to new situations. Such demands have in your opinion serious implications for the »emotional state«5 of the multitude: »opportunism, cynicism, social conformity, tireless self-denial, cheerful resignation.« You presume cynicism from the fact that an exchange of equivalents is no longer the basis for the social order. This also undermines the ideologies of equality. I have to admit that I have a hard time following your reasoning at this point. Could you please describe the problem to me again?

[b]Virno:[/b] I admit that I didn’t express myself clearly enough with regard to the problem of equality and its crisis. I limit myself to discussing only the central point in this connection: What happens in ethical terms when one switches from a capitalism based on working hours to one based on general intellect, i.e. knowledge, information and language? Inasmuch as working time determines the value of goods, it also provides the basis for the exchange of equivalents. The exchange of equivalents is the model for legal justice. Many authors have analyzed the relationship of forms of goods and categories of law, foremost among them Max Horkheimer. In the era of General Intellect, the primacy of working time collapses (as abstract time that does not have any qualities in and of itself, the pure exertion of psychophysical energy). A production process that centers on information and communication cannot be reduced to the model of an exchange of equivalents. What counts in this type of production is not the contribution of the individual (the work hours), but rather collective cooperation. The difficulty of comparing and measuring communicative and cognitive achievements will definitely have repercussions for the bourgeois idea of equality under law. The theme of »difference« appears, its unbridled proliferation, the impossibility of comparing the »different« individual subjects. All of this is important and gives us grounds for hope. As always, it is also ambivalent, however, and harbors certain dangers. This concept of »difference« in linguistic/cognitive cooperation can lead to a devaluation of equality as such (and has indeed already done so) instead of enabling a non-legal interpretation of equality. This devaluation in turn fosters opportunism and cynicism.

[b]Ronneberger:[/b] In Fordism, the supervision of the workforce shifted from what was formerly »personal« monitoring to a more »objective« form of discipline through the close integration of human activity into the mechanical manufacturing process. The advent of Postfordism has likewise brought with it a change in control procedures. You speak in this regard of a proliferation of arbitrary hierarchies that are associated with a personalization of subjugation mechanisms. In one passage of your book, you even use the interesting term »servile virtuosity.« What are the specifics of this new form of personal dependency?

[b]Virno:[/b] I believe that with Postfordism we are witnessing the end of the division of labor. In order not to provoke any misunderstandings: the division of roles and responsibilities is still strictly observed. But this division no longer has any technical foundation. It is arbitrary and changeable. Why? Because what really counts in Postfordism is cooperation in the production process, which itself is based on exercising general communicative and cognitive abilities. To put it another way: what counts is what various workers have in common. While the deployment of what is common to all – i.e. intellect and language – in production turns the technical division of responsibilities into a fiction, it leads on the other hand to a tangible personalization of subjugation. One can therefore speak of a widespread return of personal dependency within mature capitalism. »Personal« is to be understood here in a double sense: on one hand, production is dependent on a specific person (the boss, the client, etc.), not on rules that exercise an anonymous authority, and on the other hand it is the persons in their totality that are subjugated, not only a limited aspect of their selves.

[b]Ronneberger:[/b] You have created a social/anthropological sketch of the »flexible person.« After reading your text, I asked myself what the »pathological« potential of the Postfordist production process might be. The oft-times contradictory demands and the continuous mobilization of people’s entire work capacity must lead after all to enormous mental strain and disorders. A theory of the »exhausted self« has been posited in this connection.6 Do you agree with this?

[b]Virno:[/b] I completely agree with this thesis. Ehrenberg’s book is so significant that it should be used as a textbook in industrial sociology. More generally speaking, I believe that many analyses of psychopathological phenomena have great sociological significance, including studies of dissociation all the way to melancholy, of bipolar disorders to certain less pronounced forms of autism. Notwithstanding this fact, such syndromes often prove these days to be true blessings for production.

[b]Ronneberger:[/b] You speak of the »crisis of industrial society,« going so far as to pronounce that there is no longer any difference between work and unemployment. In another connection you say that wage labor lies »outside market logic« and that standardized mass labor today represents a form of »fictional social assistance.« Was this meant to be a provocative exaggeration? And did this view also lead you, in the »Grammar of the Multitude,« to decide not to separately examine the »new self-employment,« i.e. the freelancer?

[b]Virno:[/b] The phenomenon of the new self-employment has been analyzed in a paradigmatic fashion by Sergio Bologna.7 This phenomenon is one of the ways in which the tendency to overcome wage labor is being manifested within capitalist society. Another way is through the proliferation of self-organized cooperatives (the so-called third sector). Despite a thousand contradictions, these both allude to the possibility of socializing the entrepreneurial function. I don’t want to underestimate these phenomena, or in general the concrete analysis of the various forms taken by Postfordist production. When I spoke of a substantial homogeneity between work and non-work, I only wanted to point out the actual state of affairs: during work hours, we mobilize the same cognitive abilities and the same emotional resources that we draw on to deal with the unexpected events and complications we encounter in our daily lives outside work. If it is true that Postfordism enlists life itself for the purposes of work, then it is clear that the qualitative difference between work and leisure time is obliterated. But this is, I repeat, only one way to indicate how complex the analysis of the production process has become today.

[b]Ronneberger:[/b] In another interview, you emphasized that you do not use the concept of »immaterial labor.« Why not?

[b]Virno:[/b] This term seems to me to be too imprecise, even misleading. There are at least two reasons for this. First of all, classical Fordist work was also »immaterial« since not only the actual usage value that was produced was important, but also the abstract exertion of psychophysical energy. Second, the expression »immaterial labor« seems to refer only to work in the cultural field, to artistic work or jobs with a high cognitive element. The risk is that one could end up thinking here of a kind of »aristocracy« of life-embracing work. In my opinion, the interesting aspect of Postfordism is that all activities, even the »lowliest,« demand the mobilization of linguistic and communicative skills. However, it is not my intention to start an argument about the »right expression.« The term »immaterial labor« can also be used to point to the heart of the question, namely: What is the essence of life-embracing labor, of all of life-embracing labor, inasmuch as this means that General Intellect forms the template or score.

[b]Ronneberger:[/b] Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri posit that the Postfordist work regime with its constant invoking of the necessity of self-fulfillment is in a sense digging it own grave. The more »emotional value« is invested in working life, the higher chances are that individual existences will grow into a powerful opponent that will want to define for itself the conditions under which it lives and works. What is your view of this thesis?

[b]Virno:[/b] The way I see it, the general human skills (emotions, relationships, knowledge, language) that are deployed in the contemporary production process will only be expressed antagonistically if the battle against precariousness joins forces with the crystallization of a new public, with the invention of institutions that are no longer anchored in state sovereignty. To organize precarious labor means to try out new forms of non-representational democracy, to distinguish the concept of the »public« from that of the »state,« to erect the foundations of a republic of the multitude. This is what is required. And this is after all the great difficulty global movements have had to come to terms with ever since Seattle.

 

Translated by Jennifer Taylor-Gaida

 

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