Issue 4/2007 - Journal Welt


North Korea’s »Military-First Policy« and Women’s Lives

What has happened to women in the North during the period from the early 1990s to the present? By illuminating how women in the North have changed, we might be able to imagine how a society should be organized in which women from both Koreas might live together in the near future.

Gwi-ok Kim


[b]I[/b]
In the twenty-first century, the catch phrase of the North (North Korea)1 is »Military First.« A »military-first policy« conveys the strong consensus of the people of the North to overcome the economic difficulties of the 1990s, which has more often than not been described as a dark and helpless age. Women’s lives in the pre-1990 era were almost like a bed of roses compared with what happened post-1990. Around the mid- to late 1990s – whether they wanted to or not – women in the North had to leave their homes to find work to support their families, in some cases as the sole breadwinner.

It may sound like a bad joke to those who have a negative image of the North to describe life there as a bed of roses. Viewed from their own standpoint, however, people’s lives (particularly those of the women and children) in the 1970s and 80s were almost like days in »heaven.« But they probably didn’t realize how good they had it until they fell down into the »hell« of the 1990s.

In August 1998, when the North succeeded in launching its first satellite, Kwangmyungsung-1, and its economy hit rock-bottom, Kim Jung-il, Chairman of the National Defense Commission, declared the »Military-First Policy,« which he insisted would transform the country into one of the superpowers. From the early 2000s, the North began to behave in a quite different manner. Around the time of the North-South Joint Declaration of June 15, 2000, Kim proclaimed the Shinuiju region as a Special Administration Zone and set up four other Special Economic Zones. Furthermore, on July 1, 2002, he launched »Economic Management Improvement Measures.« However, when the officials of the North acknowledged the existence of a clandestine program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons, it renewed the longstanding nuclear issue, which set off another round of conflict with the USA. Finally, on October 9, 2006, the North announced it had conducted an underground nuclear explosive test. The confrontation between the North and the USA only eased somewhat when the USA allowed the North to access the frozen funds in the Banco Delta Asia (BDA). While the number of refugees from the North has been gradually decreasing since 2000, those who want to settle in the South are multiplying dramatically. Defectors from the North residing in the South have increased during the last 10 years from less than 1,000 to 10,000. In terms of gender, ten years ago female defectors made up only 10% of the refugee group in the South. From 2002 on, however, female defectors outnumbered their male counterparts; from the mid-2000s, they have reached almost 70% of total refugees settling down in the South. In Hanawon, the affiliated organization of the Ministry of National Unification that helps refugees relocate to the South, the proportion of males to females – having ranged from 8:2 to 7:3 in 2000 – is now reversed to 2:8.

The motives of those who escaped from the North around 2002 seem a bit different from those of the previous period. In the period between the 1990s and the early 2000s, they left the North mainly because of economic difficulties and starvation. For this reason, many early defectors insisted, »We would not have left our home if it had not been for economic problems.« After 2002, however, they began to cross the border in quest of »a better life and better education for their family.« Women especially were much more motivated by the desire for a better educational environment and living conditions for their children.

What can be inferred from this situation is that the living conditions in the North have slightly improved since 2000, but that the social milieu that women and children have to inhabit has scarcely gotten better.

[b]II[/b]
»Pom Hyang Gi« (The Spring Fragrance) was one of the hit movies in the North in 2005, featuring the true story of a factory in Shinuiju that produces high-quality cosmetics. Until the 1990s, all the products of this factory were to be exported. According to a report, however, around 2000 the factory began to produce some goods for domestic consumers after Kim Jung-il visited there and lamented, »Why should we make goods that are not even available to our people?« That is to say, »The Spring Fragrance« figuratively expresses Kim’s will to balm women’s faces and hands that have gotten chapped with economic difficulties. According to »Kim Il-sung’s North Korea,« the CIA report about 1970s-80s North Korea written by Helen-Louise Hunter, women in the North liked to put on makeup and preen themselves the most among three communist countries including China and ex-USSR. In the 2000s, women I encountered in various meetings still liked to put on makeup, which did not cover their weary faces and withered hands, however. In the 1990s, it was very difficult to get daily necessities, let alone cosmetics. There appeared covert and even organized prostitution, which had virtually disappeared early in the 1950s. Furthermore, some refugees organized criminal syndicates for human traffic. At any rate, the economic depression of the 1990s had a devastating effect on women’s lives in the North. In this sense, »The Spring Fragrance« was meant not merely to care for women’s worn skin, but also to soothe their impoverished bodies and souls.

Let me analyze »Chosun Women,«2 the organ of the Association of Chosun Democratic Women (hereafter referred to as the »Women’s Association«), which will allow us to take a look at the troubled lives of women in the North. An article in the magazine describes the construction of a power station at the Geomduk Mine, vividly encapsulating difficulties caused by the economic depression.

It was April of the year of »Juche 87« (1998).3 Learning that the mine was attempting to construct a power plant on its own, all female workers and leading members of the Association of Chosun Democratic Women rose to take part in the dam construction at the heart of the project.
The dam is a public work requiring the building of an enormous wall out of thousands of cubic meters of gravel and sand. Without electric power, however, the mine cannot produce anything. What’s worse, in the rainy season the mine can become flooded with water so that precious facilities can be destroyed. Knowing so well that power is inevitably connected to their lives, the women cannot help taking the initiative. … Motivated by that force, all the members of the Women’s Association do not hesitate to jump into the river to gather gravel to build the dam … They are not unaware that when they return home they have their own parents-in-laws and children waiting for them, yet don’t have enough rice to cook dinner for their family. (CW no. 9, 2002)

Whether those women were forced or volunteered to work, this article conveys some truths. First of all, whether they build a power plant or pave a road, there are few working tools available to them except bare hands, hammers and spades, or at best oxen and oxcarts. Any existing machines are rotting due to the lack of fuel. It is not a rare case to find women working with their bare hands on various construction sites. Almost all the women I met looked so tired and seared by sunlight.

Second, when the distribution system of food and other daily necessities came to a halt, women were made to take on essential roles in both the national and household economies. Along with the food crisis, ongoing shortages in fuel and power caused factories to reduce their work capacity to as low as 20-30%; as a consequence, most factories could not but shut down. The food shortage began to emerge as a serious problem from the early 1990s, and the worst flooding, which continued for three years from 1995, brought the whole system of food rationing to a halt. As the public system of food supply no longer functioned, individuals were forced to find their own food. Although male members of the family had nothing to work on, they were still tied up in the factories. Therefore, it was women who took over the job of obtaining food.

All of a sudden, our country and its people, who have lost the nation’s beloved Father, are faced with trials and tribulations. Our soil, which used to ring with romantic laughter and songs, is beginning to be stained with blood dripping from the people’s »Troubled March« and shadowed by a dark spirit.

Some are at a loss what to do; others try to probe for a way out of darkness; others run here and there to look for food and daily necessities in the marketplaces.
In this situation, housewives tend to rise to their feet against all the trials. Comrade Seo Jungshim tries her best to ideologically strengthen the internal solidarity of the Women’s Association.

Despite our comrade Seo’s vigorous efforts to encourage fellow women not to be down because of this temporary hardship, many women are beginning to leave the organization to make a living. (CW no. 4, 2003)
As described in the quotation above, there was a strong tendency in the North for women to assume the role of breadwinner.

What is remarkable here is that the capitalist mode of »market economy« was gradually expanding. When factories stopped functioning and the production of grain radically dropped, a few farmers began to hoard secretly and sell rice in farmers’ markets or black markets in which they could profiteer enormously. Since there was little rice to be purchased by the government, most factory laborers and office workers could no longer depend on the governmental system of food rationing, which had lasted for last 50 years. To earn their living, women had to bring out all their household belongings to the market. Some attempted to cross provincial borders, the Aprok River, or the Duman River to buy necessities in Korean communities in China, which allowed them far larger profits. It was only natural that the price of necessities skyrocketed. In the North, this unusual phenomenon was called the »non-socialist phenomenon,« since it did not fit in at all with the socialist concept. Later, the black market and the farmers’ market were combined and developed into the »General Market« (Jonghap shijang).

Third, the economic hardship often made women abandon their families. In some cases, both parents ran away; in other cases, a whole family disappeared. The crisis of family and the impoverishment caused by the »Troubled March« were emblematically expressed in two social phenomena: first, child abuse, commonly known as »flower swallows« (ggot-je-bi)4 and, second, forced prostitution of women from the North in China and other countries. There are a number of women who – after having experienced several stints of border-crossing and forced prostitution – finally arrived in the South.

Although the North did not officially acknowledge prostitution (which had been eradicated for the last 50 years), the economy seemed revitalized by some individual women, whom »Chosun Women« referred to as »female wretches« who »have improper relations with men« (CW no. 5, 2003). Such a woman had been hard to find in the past.

By the time the abandoned children and other family members emerged as a critical issue, the government had taken three major steps. In the North, when children and disabled or old people are abandoned or left unprotected, their relatives are responsible for taking care of them. If that is impossible, their neighbors are expected to take them in. If nothing else works, they are supposed to be sent to special facilities. In the North, the special facility includes a »yuk-ah-won« (baby-care center), »ae-yuk-won« (kindergarten for orphans), »so-nyun-hak-won« (elementary school for orphans), »chung-dung-hak-won« (middle school for orphans), and asylums for the aged (»yang-no-won«). There are 14 »yuk-ah-wons« (under the control of the Ministry of Health) across the country, for taking care of parentless children under four. When children reach four, they are transferred to the »ae-yuk-won,« in which they are raised and educated until they go to regular schools. Nationally, there are 12 »ae-yuk-wons,« one in each city and province, under the control of the Ministry of Education. Not only orphans but also those who do not get proper care at home (including children of single-parent families and triplets or quadruplets) can be housed in these facilities.

»Chosun Women« has reported several admirable stories about those who have taken care of orphaned children – for instance, a married couple in Hamhung brought up 30 parentless children (CW no. 3, 1999); a widow in Kumya-eup, Hamkyungnam-do, adopted and raised 13 children (CW no. 5, 2002); a woman in Heungnam City, Hamkyungnam-do, adopted 54 children (CW no. 7, 2002). Such stories appeal to many people in the North. Symptomatically read, however, they reveal that public institutions do not work properly to the extent that individuals have to take over part of the government’s responsibility.

Fourth, it seems that society as a whole in the North has been quite slackened. From the past to the present, the society of the North has been based on solidarity, under the motto »One for all; all for one.« One of the ways of maintaining social solidarity is to make every member of society have a sense of belonging. In other words, no one should feel socially alienated.

As for study meetings, small-group studies have been conducted on the topics assigned from the higher group and exactly according to the proposed schedule. Yet they were not very effective. The study meeting failed to provide the diverse programs and methodologies that are required in a class that is made up of heterogeneous members — ranging from 20 up to 70 years old, and having different levels of knowledge. (CW no. 2, 2000)

This situation implies that the re-socializing system for women is rather standardized and its methodology is quite awkward (usually, women have been repeatedly inculcated with political ideology). That is to say, the continuing education of women has failed to reflect the shift in women’s social status and environment. Furthermore, the women in question possibly regarded it as nothing but part of formalized convention to go to the study meetings. In fact, the social unity of the North already began to loosen from the mid-1990s, which resulted in the breakdown of social organizations. From 2000 on, the North has spent much time and energy rebuilding social structures and organizations.

[b]III[/b]
»Arirang« (which was a big hit in 2002) stirred up the whole country once again in 2005. »Arirang« means Huge Group Gymnastic Art Performance, with more than 100,000 participants. The North promoted Arirang performance for two reasons: first, it is symbolic of seamless national unity; second, it could earn dollars. Authorities in the North seemed to put more emphasis on the first. Arirang performance can be compared with the first artificial satellite, Kwang-myung-sung-1-ho. If the latter was a military landmark signaling that the North has just escaped from serious economic trouble, the Arirang performance can be seen as a cultural landmark declaring the restoration of the social system. To put it in other words, the message of the Arirang performance is that people should not only restore the social order that has been relaxed, but also pursue the future goals of a »Military-First Policy,« »practical socialism,« an information-industry-oriented society, and self-reliant and peaceful reunification of the nation. »Chosun Women« was filled with writings expressing the national will to build a new social order. These articles attempted in particular to come up with various ways to overcome the economic crisis. First, they suggested some activities for housewives or those women who do not participate in economic activity. In the North, since 1968, such activities have been called the »revolution at home,« at whose center are housewives.
Viewed from the perspective not only of their social position but also their environment, it is important to revolutionize housewives. Unlike working women who are ideologically trained through working together with others in groups and organizations, housewives are separated from social reality, left alone within the boundaries of the household. Therefore, if they do not ceaselessly make efforts to revolutionize themselves, they are very likely to be social failures – not only unwilling to labor, but also saturated with a negative type of individualism. Despite having worked hard and well, some women tend to become lazy and selfish after getting married only to be indulged in the comforts of married life. Their primary concern is not to deal with important social agendas but instead their own private affairs. This situation suggests how important it is to educate and train housewives ideologically. (CW no. 4, 2003)

In a society like the North in which priority is given to collective values over individual ones, the dissolution of social organizations means the breakdown of social unity. For the North, it has become a pressing issue to rebuild social organizations that have been gradually weakened since the recent economic depression. For this reason, even housewives are expected to step out of the household and participate in social organizations and economic activity. That is to say, the North is trying to establish a whole new conception of the housewife – as a person qualified to be a valuable member of the »socialist extended family.«
Furthermore, it is also considered women’s virtue and responsibility to avoid divorces and to keep the family from collapsing. One of articles in »Chosun Women« argues: »Once they get married, women should make every effort to prevent shameful things such as divorces and family troubles from destroying their family by carefully nursing their children and leading family members harmoniously and happily.« (CW no. 9, 2003). This argument reflects the North’s social consensus of allowing individuals to choose their spouses freely but suppressing the liberty of divorcing.

Second, one of housewives’ social activities is to participate in the Women’s Association. Since, however, as implied in an argument, »housewives tend to be pushed to the frontline of all the trials« (CW no. 4, 2003), it is possible that fewer women have participated in the Association since the last economic depression. In order to encourage women to play a central role in restoring the social order, »Chosun Women« selects a passionate participant in the Association and puts her life story in every issue. For instance: During the course of examining the state of affairs, Comrade Aehee came to realize that there are a few women living separated from the organization both ideologically and physically. Comrade Choi Aehee visited Comrade Hwang Poksoon, who seldom participated in the organization. But her door was locked. Later, Comrade Aehee visited several times more but all to no avail. Lonely walks to her friend in the night made her so exhausted that she dropped off to sleep in front of her friend’s door. When she woke up, it was so dark and silent that even the stars in the sky were dozing off. (CW no.7, 2003)

In the North, every woman is legally required to join social organizations so that the Women’s Association has as many as 1,200,000 members. Since the depression in the 1990s, however, more and more women have stopped coming to the Association. It is their legal responsibility to participate in the organization, but the problem is that the political and ideological education alone can no longer force them into the Association. Authorities in the North thus encourage some locally based small group activities such as training for a part-time job or fine arts education. Locally based job training includes a »home business class,« which has been prolonged as the »3rd of August Campaign for Producing People’s Necessities.«5 Recently, individual women have been encouraged to take on a side job. While this phenomenon may have been defined as anti-socialist in the past, authorities in the North now approach this in a more practical way, regarding it as »practical socialism« as long as it contributes to the restoration of the national economy. As a result, products of the home business classes and other private business are traded in »General Market.«

Additionally, along with the extension of Arirang performance, the North is also promoting small-group fine art study. Members of fine-art study groups either enjoy artistic activities as a hobby or perform dance, music and plays at nearby factories, farming towns, or construction sites. The promotion of artistic activities can imply, »If unable to produce any economic outcomes, the Women’s Association should delight people fatigued with economic difficulty through artistic activities.« To put it in other words, housewives can not only experience the enjoyment of group life from participating in fine-art study groups, but they can also contribute to their community through public performances. The North’s promotion of artistic activities is designed to provide opportunities for both an individual’s rebuilding of her own identity as a woman of a communist country and for tightening social unity.

Third, housewives are also encouraged to participate in »inminban.« Except family, »inminban« is the smallest unit of social organizations, which consists of 20-30 families and in which economically inactive people are expected to join. The chief of the »inminban« gets paid regularly. The chief is usually in charge of reporting those moving in and out to higher authorities and issuing recommendation letters for school admission and marriage certificates. The importance of »inminban« was stressed by Kim Jung-il in 1972. It was not until the 1990s – when many factories shut down, more women left home to earn a living, and single-parent or parentless families increased, that the role of »inminban« was foregrounded. If someone goes on a business trip and there is no one to take care of his/her children, a neighbor in the same »inminban« usually babysits them.

Finally, in the North, there is a strong tendency to connect women’s social activity with »maternity.« That is to say, maternity is regarded as the most important aspect of women’s activity in the Women’s Association and »inminban.« As mentioned above, the North promotes the adoption of children abandoned due to the economic depression. This encouragement of adoption can also be understood in terms of the emphasis on maternity. Women are also expected to take the initiative in socially supporting the army.

During the past few decades, our women have created an admirable custom of taking motherly care of the People’s Army with the banner of »Military First« raised up high. In the era of »Military First,« with an awakening to the solemn duty as a national subject, women are willing to establish the great family tradition of sending their beloved sons and daughters to the frontline of national defense. (CW no. 2, 2003)

It is not an exaggeration to say that the North has been maintaining society under the banner of the »Military-First Policy« from the mid-1990s to the present. Of course, it is inevitable and even necessary to support the People’s Army since it props up the national economy and defense. However, the problem is why it should be women who are forced to sacrifice themselves in supporting the military. More importantly, the emphasis on women’s role at a time of national crisis tends to incarcerate women in a reified image of »mother.« The North has in fact managed to establish a system that has long supported gender equality and it is also true that male subjects have sacrificed themselves in order to keep that system in motion. However, the »Military-First Policy« is about to nullify that system. Women in the North are doubly exploited by household chores on the one hand and by masculine demands to participate in social activity on the other. In this sense, the »Military-First« discourse is a thoroughly patriarchal one that is meant to subordinate female subjects to cultural conservatism and phallocentrism.

[b]IV[/b]
In 2001, a TV miniseries called »Home« became a big hit in the North. This series features a married couple who are on the verge of divorcing but surmount the crisis through social networks. This series was originally made to air ten episodes, but its final episode could not be broadcast. The reason is unknown, even though some suspect there was a problem with its conclusion. My argument is this: The TV series was originally adopted from Paik Nam-ryong’s novel »Friend,« in which the conflict between man and wife ends up with reconciliation. When the novel was first published in the 1980s, it created a sensation because it dealt with the problem of divorce, one that was then unfamiliar to people in the North. In contrast, by the time »Home« was aired in the 2000s, divorce was no longer an extraordinary phenomenon because of the economic depression. The producer of the show may have been faced with a dilemma – whether he should incorporate the changed reality into its ending (that is, to end it with divorce), or conclude it with a boring didacticism – an ending that every artist armed with socialist realism should seek. In this sense, the failure to complete the series can be viewed as signaling that the North is being dismantled from below.

However, the problem is that either destroying the traditional family or attempting to rebuild it can hardly be a solution to the current socioeconomic crisis. It is also hard to decide whether the dissolution of the family is favorable to women in general. What is evident is that strong familial unity is good for women, especially in the Third World.

In some sense, the North’s attempt at transcending the social crisis by tightening family ties is not very different from neo-liberalist countries’ mythologizing of the family. The difference is that while most capitalist societies fundamentally function based upon individualism, the North’s organizing principle is collectivism. In other words, whereas it is not necessary to align individuals’ interests with collective ones in a capitalist society, there must not be any difference between individuals’ interests and the national cause in the North.

In the 1990s, however, the North experienced a serious contradiction between individuals’ interest and the collective good. In the past, individuals (or their families) could be compensated for their sacrifices through the social welfare system. Yet the economic depression dismantled the foundations of the social security system, and thus each individual was responsible for his/her existence.
Now, the North is endeavoring to close off the gap between individual and society. It has introduced »practical socialism« and launched »The July 2002 Economic Management Improvement Measures,« whose essence was to revitalize the half-capitalist market mode and satisfy people’s suppressed desires. Subsequently, it raised the wages of laborers and office workers up to a realistic level and left the prices of agricultural products determined by the market system. The Inter-Korea Economic Cooperation – which has helped expand job opportunities since 2000 – also added a driving force to its economic restoration, reflecting most Northerners’ desire to have more opportunities for working with the South. For women in the North, the improvement of employment conditions is desirable because it will not only ease them of social and familial responsibilities but also restore basic women’s rights. Ultimately, it is only when both Koreas put the reduction of armaments into practice, and the nuclear problem is settled peacefully and rationally, that women in the North will be liberated from multiple exploitations (although perfect gender equality is still far behind). For this reason, women in the North are singing of »reunification,« not because it is the national ideal, but because it is the only way they can choose in order to survive.

Finally, people in the South must not forget the sore fact that the refugees from the North are desperately longing for the homes and families they have left behind. While struggling to settle down in the South, some try to send even the slightest amounts of money to their families in the North. Most of them are spending sleepless nights with broken hearts and irrepressible yearnings for home and family. We must share their pain and efforts.

 

 

1 The term »North Korea« is a very problematic one because it is neither an official name nor an abbreviation (DPRK) of »Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,« but merely an arbitrary and South Korea-centered terminology. In this essay, therefore, I will use the more neutral terms »the North« and »the South« instead of »North Korea« and »South Korea.«
2 »Chosun Women« will be cited as CW with issue numbers and years.
3 »Juche« or »Juche Ideology,« originally coined by Kim Il-sung in 1955, is the official state ideology of North Korea and the political system based on it. The core principle of the Juche ideology since the 1970s has been that man is the master of everything and decides everything. Juche literally means »main body« or »subject«; It has also been translated in North Korean sources as »independent stand« and the »spirit of self-reliance.« – translator.
4 In the North, »Ggot-je-bi« originally referred to a pickpocket and now it includes a vagabond or a homeless person. This word has existed for a long time in the North, but in the South it is mistakenly understood as a newly coined term referring to a helpless poor child in the North. For this reason, many people in the South take it for a symptom of the North’s early breakdown.
5 This campaign was spread all over the country after Kim Jung-il visited the »Exhibition of Light Industry Goods« on August 3, 1984. The campaign originated in a clothing company in Pyongyang in which female laborers and housewives bought waste articles and made from them clothing and other necessities of life to sell in farmers’ markets.